We study a condition of favoring cooperation in a Prisoner's Dilemma game on complex networks. There are two kinds of players: cooperators and defectors. Cooperators pay a benefit b to their neighbors at a cost c, whereas defectors only receive the benefit b. The game is a death-birth process with weak selection. Although it has been widely thought that b/c > k is a condition of favoring cooperation [1], we find that b/c > k nn is the condition. We also show that among three representative networks, namely, regular, random, and scale-free, a regular network favors cooperation the most, whereas a scale-free network favors cooperation the least. In an ideal scale-free network where network size is infinite, cooperation is never realized. Whether or not the scale-free network and network heterogeneity favor cooperation depends on the details of a game, although it is occasionally believed that scale-free networks favor cooperation irrespective of game structures. If the number of players are small, then the cooperation is favored in scale-free networks.
Introduction
Although a player incurs a lot of cost for cooperative behavior and being selfish is usually more beneficial than being cooperative as one player, cooperative behavior is ubiquitously observed in various forms of life system including even single cell. Cooperation is even the basis of life system, eco-system, and animal society including human being. Thereby, the research on how cooperation emerges and being enhanced have attracted much attention [2] in game theory. To answer the question Prisoner's Dilemma game is often used, in which being defector is always better off than being cooperator and, however, both of the players being cooperators are always better off than both of them being defectors. This game structure reflects the situation of interest in reality.
The seminal paper [3] introduced a spatial structure in the game theory and showed that a lattice structure enhanced cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma game. Since then, it has been well recognized that the spatial structure is one factor affecting the emergence of cooperation and thus a lot of effort has been made in this direction [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] . In contrast, cooperation is often inhibited by spatial structure in snow drift games [17] . The spatial structure is regarded as a network. Many networks in reality are not often regular lattice; rather, they are often small-world; scale-free; or heterogenous heterogeneous networks. It has also been recognized that underlying network structures crucially determine an outcome of the models such as percolation, synchronization, epidemic spread, the Ising , voter, and a lot of other models [18, 19] . Thereby, many researchers have expressed interest in games on such complex networks recently (see review [20] ) and explored especially how network structures such as the small-world characteristics, the scale-freeness, the network heterogeneity, and so on, affect the emergence of cooperation. For instance, Refs. [21] [22] [23] showed that the scale-free network enhanced cooperation. Contrary to them, in the present paper we will conclude for the Prisoner's Dilemma model defined in section 2 that cooperation is inhibited by scale-free or heterogeneous network and enhanced by regular network, agreeing with Refs. [3, 24] .
The review [2] entitled "Five rules for the evolution of cooperation" listed five mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation: kin selection, direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, network reciprocity, and group selection. We will show that the condition of favoring cooperation exactly corresponds to the network reciprocity of the five mechanisms. More specifically, the condition is b/c > k nn for general uncorrelated networks (in which the degree and the nearest neighbor degree do not correlate), where b and c are the benefit and the cost of the Prisoner's Dilemma game, and k nn is the mean degree of the nearest neighbors. Although many preceding researches are numerical simulations, we will analytically derive the condition by using pair approximation and mean-field approximation in heterogenous networks.
Previously, however, it was widely believed for the same model that the general condition for favoring cooperation is b/c > k [1] (and reviews [2, 20] ), where k is the mean degree. The point here is the difference between k nn and k . The difference is essential in network theory, producing interesting results in complex networks; see Refs. [25] [26] [27] . It is not too much to say that owing to the difference network theory can exist. If a network has no degree-degree correlation, then k nn = k 2 / k . The probability that an end of a link is attached to a vertex with degree k, P nn (k), is given by
# Ends attached to vertices with degree k # All the ends of links in the network
where P (k) is the degree distribution. Therefore, we have
The present paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we will explain the model. From section 3 to 6, we will derive the condition. In section 7 we will give an intuition why b/c > k nn is the condition. In section 10 we will confirm the condition by numerical simulations. Finally, we will conclude in section 11.
Model
Let us introduce the model. We consider two kinds of players: cooperators (C) and defectors (D). Cooperators pay a benefit b to their neighbors at a cost c, while defectors only receive the benefit. The game is a Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) game. The payoff matrix of the game is given by
The game proceeds as follows. (See also Fig. 1 .) At each time step, a randomly selected player dies. The adjacent players compete for the empty vertex, occupying it with a probability proportional to their fitness defined below; this is called the death-birth process. There is another interpretation of an evolutionary game [28] . At each time step, an player is randomly chosen and updates his strategy by imitating his neighbors' strategy with a probability proportional to their payoff. We can thereby regard the model as a model of human behavior, which is called imitation dynamics in social sciences.
The fitness of each player F is given by the sum of constant term, the baseline fitness 1 − w and the payoff from the game P multiplied by w; namely, F = 1 − w + wP . We set w ≪ 1, which is called weak selection. Then the probabilities of strategies change only slowly.
In Fig. 1 , for example, the total payoff of cooperators around the randomly chosen shaded vertex is F C = 2 − 2w + w(5b − 6c), while that of defectors is F D = 2 − 2w + 3wb. The central randomly chosen player will be updated to a cooperator with the probability F C /(F C + F D ) and to be a defector with the probability
The update rule is a replicator dynamics extended to a network. If a network is complete, it is equivalent to a replicator dynamics:
where p i is the probability of strategy i, P i is the mean payoff from the game of the player adopting strategy i, andP is the mean payoff from the game over all players. This is called replicator equation on graphs [29] .
In the following, we explain the criterion whether a network favors cooperation or not. As the initial condition, we prepare a network in which all the vertices are occupied by defectors only. Next, we replace one of them by a single cooperator and run the evolutionary games until all the vertices are occupied either by only defectors, or by only cooperators. There are only two terminal states: one is that the whole network is occupied by cooperators only and the other is that it is occupied by defectors only. We iterate the same game a number of times and obtain the probability that only cooperators occupy the vertices. This probability is called the fixation probability ρ C [30] . If the selection neither favors nor opposes cooperation, the fixation probability ρ C is 1/N, where N is the network size, because the density of the cooperators in the initial condition is 1/N. If the fixation probability ρ C is larger than 1/N, we say that the network structure favors cooperation, and vice versa.
We want to know the dynamics of the probability of cooperators p C . However, we first study the more general problem of the following payoff matrix with strategy A and B:
A B A x y B z s .
A player is set on each vertex and plays games with its neighbors only. We consider a network without degree-degree correlations. We want to know the dynamics of the probability distribution of cooperators p C . However, we first study the problem of the general setting in Eq. (5), and then of the Prisoner's Dilemma game. Let N(k) denote the number of vertices with degree k and let P (k) denote degree distribution. Let P nn (k nn ) denote the probability that an adjacent vertex has degree k nn ; P nn (k nn ) is the degree distribution of nearest neighbors, which is different from the degree distribution P (k). Let p X (k) denote the probability of strategy X on a vertex with degree k. We use the pair approximation [31] . Let q X|Y (k nn , k) denote the conditional probability of finding an Xplayer, given that the adjacent vertex is occupied by a Y -player, and that the degrees of the X-player and the Y -player are k nn and k, respectively. For example, the probability that a randomly chosen vertex is a Y -player with degree k and a next neighboring vertex is a X-player with degree
We now provide the outline of derivation. We need to know the dynamics of p A , where p A is the probability of strategy A in the whole network. For this purpose, we also need the dynamics of the conditional probabilities such as q A|A (k nn , k). As such, we first calculatė p A (k), and then calculateq A|A (k nn , k). Then, we calculate the fixation probability ρ A by a diffusion approximation. The terminal state of the probability p A is either 1 or 0 only and the fixation probability of strategy A, ρ A , is the probability that p A reaches 1 in one game. At the final stage, we substitute the payoff matrix (5) with the Prisoner's Dilemma game (3) , and then we have the condition of favoring cooperation b/c > k nn .
We will follow the derivation of Ref. [1] . The difference is that we consider the heterogeneity of degree distribution explicitly. Therefore, a probability of strategy and a conditional probability depend on the degree k and nearest neighbor degree k nn , so that we write them as p X (k) and q X|Y (k nn , k) as defined above. In addition, in order to deal with a heterogenous network we use a mean-field approximation for network structure that we will explain in the following. As a result of the mean-field approximation we will have two kinds of the probability of strategy p X and p nn X , and two kinds of the conditional probability q X|Y and q nn X|Y . The definitions will be given below. In the mean-field approximation for a heterogenous network structure, the degree of a vertex adjacent to any randomly chosen vertex is replaced by the mean degree of nearest neighbors k nn as illustrated in Fig. 2(a) . Subsequently, a vertex with degree k nn is also surrounded by vertices with degree k nn as illustrated in Fig. 2(b) . Further, a degree of any randomly chosen vertex is replaced by the mean degree k . Thus, in the meanfield approximation the probability of strategy A on a randomly chosen vertex is given by p A ( k ), and the probability of strategy A on a neighbor of a randomly chosen vertex is given by p A ( k nn ).
Dynamics of probability of strategy
First, we study the case where a B-player with degree k is randomly chosen with probability p B (k)P (k) and changes the strategy from B to A, and consequently p A increases by 1/N(k). Because we need p A ( k ) and p A ( k nn ), we compute p A (k) first and then substitute k and k nn later on.
Let k A and k B denote the number of A-players and B-players in the neighborhood of that randomly chosen B-player. As such, k A + k B = k. Because of the mean-field approximation we replace the degree of any neighboring vertex by k nn , and the degrees of A-players and B-players around the randomly chosen B-player by both k nn . We define q nn X|Y ≡ q X|Y ( k nn , k nn ). Degrees of neighboring vertices of the neighbors of any randomly chosen vertex are k nn as illustrated in Fig. 2(b) . Thus, for example, the probability that a neighbor of an A-player neighboring to the randomly chosen vertex is a B-player is given by q B|A ( k nn , k nn ) ≡ q nn B|A . Therefore, the expected fitness of A-players and B-players adjacent to the chosen B-player, f A and f B , respectively, are given by
The probability that the randomly chosen B-player changes the strategy from B to A is then given by
The probability that a randomly chosen B-player has k A A-players and k B B-players in the neighborhood is given by
Therefore, the probability that a B-player is randomly chosen and changes the strategy from B to A, and consequently p A (k) increases by 1/N(k) is given by
Next, we consider the case where an A-player is randomly chosen and then the A-player changes the strategy from A to B, and consequently p A (k) decreases by 1/N(k).
The probability that an A-player with degree k is chosen is p A (k)P (k). Suppose that around the randomly chosen A-player, there are k A A-players and k B B-players and the probability that such a configuration occurs is given by
The expected fitness of A-players and B-players adjacent to the randomly chosen A-player, g A and g B , respectively, are given by
Thus the probability that the randomly chosen A-player changes strategy from A to B is given by
Therefore, the probability that an A-player is randomly chosen to update the strategy and then changes the strategy from A to B, and consequently the probability of strategy A with degree k decreases by 1/N(k) is given by
Combining Eqs. (10) and (15), we have
Because the degree of any randomly chosen vertex is k , thus the probability of strategy A in the network is p A ( k ) in the mean-field approximation. Thus we have
Recall that q X|Y ≡ q X|Y ( k nn , k ).
We also need to have E [△p
is the probability of strategy A in the neighborhood of a randomly chosen player. Substituting k nn with k of Eq. (16), we have
The fact that the set of equations is closed here is due to the mean-field approximation.
Dynamics of conditional probability
We then go on to the dynamics of conditional probabilities q A|A and q nn A|A . We again use the mean-field approximation, replacing degree of any randomly chosen vertex by k and that of any adjacent vertex by k nn . First, we study the dynamics of q A|A ≡ q A|A ( k nn , k ).
We now study the case where q A|A increases. For this purpose, suppose that a Bplayer is randomly chosen and then changes the strategy from B to A. Suppose that the randomly chosen B-player is linked to k A A-players and k B B-players. The probability that the B-player with this configuration is chosen is given by
The probability that the randomly chosen B-player changes the strategy from B to A is given by
After the B-player changes the strategy, the conditional probability q A|A increases by
because conditional probability q A|A (k nn , k) is given by the number of linked pairs of an A-player with degree k nn and an A-player with degree k divided by the number of linked pairs of an A-player with degree k and a player of any strategy with degree k nn . Using the fact that p A changes of order O(w), which will be confirmed later, the above equation becomes
Next, we are going to study the case where q A|A decreases. Suppose that an A-player is randomly chosen and the A-player has k A A-players and k B B-players in the neighborhood. The probability that the A-player with such a configuration is chosen is
The probability that the A-player changes the strategy from A to B is
After the A-player changes the strategy, the conditional probability q A|A decreases by
Therefore, we have
Analogously, we will compute E[q
The derivation is given in detail in Appendix A.
The System of Equations
We now simplify the master equations in Eqs. (17), (18), (26) , and (27) . Transforminġ p A in Eq. (17), we have
where
while the conditional probabilityq A|A in Eq. (26) is transformed to
We confirmed thatṗ A is of order O(w), whereasq A|A is of order O(w 0 ). To derive Eq. (28), we used the mean-field relation
the reason why it holds is discussed in Appendix B. Owing to this relation the O(w 0 ) terms in Eq. (28) vanish.
Equations (18) and (27) lead to
and
We thus confirmed thatṗ We now have the following system of equations:
where the functions F i are defined in Eqs. (28) , (32) , (30) , and (34). The equations ofṗ andṗ nn are of order O(w), whereas the equations ofq A|A and ofq nn A|A are of order O(w 0 ). Because w ≪ 1 meaning weak selection, the conditional probabilities q A|A and q nn A|A converge to stationary values much faster than p A and p nn A do. Thus the system very quickly converges to the slow manifold given by F 3 = 0 and F 4 = 0. Therefore, we assume that the following equations always hold:
Because the relations concerning the strategy pair, 
The condition of favoring cooperation
Remember that our concern is the dynamics of p A . We now approximate the dynamics of p A as a diffusion process [32, 33] . Eliminating the conditional probabilities from Eqs. (36) and using Eqs. (10, 15) , we have the expectation value of △p A and the variance of △p A as follows:
The dynamics of p A is approximated by the diffusion process with the drift m(p A ) and the variance v(p A ) for unit time step △t.
The fixation probability of strategy A, ρ A (r), for the initial probability p A (t = 0) = r, satisfies the following differential equation:
Now, we use the Prisoner's Dilemma pay-off matrix given by
The differential equation (42) becomes
Since w ≪ 1, ρ C (1) = 1, and ρ C (0) = 0, we have the solution of Eq.(44) in the form
As we discussed in section 2, the criterion that a network favors cooperation is ρ C (1/N) > 1/N. Therefore, we have
This is the condition that a network favors cooperation.
Intuition: Why is b/c > k nn the condition?
We present intuitive reasoning of why the condition for favoring cooperation is b/c > k nn . The point is that the mean degree of players competing for the vacant vertex is k nn . In the mean-field picture, any vertex is surrounded by vertices with degree k nn , as illustrated in Fig. 3 . 
Subtracting the second equation from the first one, we have 
Which networks favor cooperation the most and the least
Because our condition b/c > k nn depends on k nn , we can see which of the three representative networks, regular, random, and scale-free, favors cooperation the most and the least. For this comparison purposes, we fix k (≡ µ) for the three networks. Even though k is the same, k nn can be different.
In general, we have
where σ 2 is the variance of the degree distribution. For a regular network, k nn regular = µ since σ 2 = 0. The degree distribution of a random network is Poisson. Because the mean and the variance of Poisson distribution are the same, we have k nn random = k + 1 for a random network. Therefore, k nn regular < k nn random . A scale-free network is a network in which the degree distribution P (k) follows P (k) ∼ k −γ typically with 2 < γ ≤ 3. The mean degree of the nearest neighbors of a scale-free network of infinite size is
for 2 < γ ≤ 3. Thus, the inequality k nn regular < k nn random < k nn scale-free holds for almost all the cases of interest.
Among the three network classes, a regular network favors cooperation the most and a scale-free network favors it the least. In an ideal scale-free network of infinite size and with 2 < γ ≤ 3, cooperation is unfeasible because k nn scale-free is infinite. Because of Eq. (53), the network heterogeneity increases k nn . In other words, a heterogenous network suppresses cooperation. The feature that the scale-free network suppresses cooperation is seen in the numerical simulations in Ref. [1] and also agrees with Ref. [24] . However, Refs. [21] [22] [23] claim that the scale-free network and the heterogenous network conversely favors cooperation. This is probably because the rule of the games are different. Whether or not the scale-free network and the heterogenous network favor cooperation depends on the details of the game, although it is occasionally believed that these favor cooperation irrespective of the rule of a game.
If the number of players are small, then the cooperation is favored
As is stated yet, scale-free networks are ubiquitously observed networks in the reality and cooperation is widely observed in nature. We show that cooperation is not favored in scale-free networks. You may think that they are contradicting. However, the key is the number of players. The mean degree of the nearest neighbors k nn increases with the number of players in scale-free networks. Therefore, If the number of players are small, then the mean degree of nearest neighbors is small, and then the cooperation is favored. This would not be the case if the condition were determined by the mean degree k , since the mean degree k is a fixed value determined by the exponent γ when the network size N is large enough. We are considering typcial scale-free networks by which we mean 2 < γ ≤ 3. In the following, we show numerically that the condition (46) holds well, verifying our approximations. We simulate the game on several networks with b/c set to different values. The random networks are Erdos-Reyni random networks [34] . The scale-free networks are made by a preferential attachment mechanism [35, 36] . In Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 , the x axis indicates b/c, while the y axis does the fixation probability. The horizontal straight line corresponds to the neutral probability given by 1/N. If a point is above the horizontal line, the network favors cooperation by definition; if the point is below the horizontal line, the network suppresses cooperation. The vertical broken line indicates the point where b/c = k nn . Our condition holds exactly if a point falls onto the crossing of the horizontal and vertical lines. Figure 6 and Fig. 7 show that for both random and scale-free networks, our condition holds well.
Simulations
We constructed the scale-free networks in the following way. First, we prepare a complete network consisting of K vertices, in which all the vertices are connected to each other. Next, a new vertex with m links enters into the existing network. The probability that the new vertex is connected to an existing vertex i is
where k i is the degree of vertex i. Next, another new vertex enters the exiting network in the same way. After repeating this process, we have a scale-free network. As N gets large enough the exponent γ of the degree distribution of the scale-free network asymptotically converges to γ = 3 + A/m. In the simulation, we use m = k /2, K = m + 1, N = 600, and A is such that 3 + A/m = 7.5, so that the exponent γ is 7.5. In Fig. 8 , we compare the random and the scale-free networks. The network size N, w, and the mean degree k are taken to be the same. The comparison shows that random networks favor cooperation more than scale-free networks do, because the fixation probabilities for random networks are greater for all the points.
Conclusion
We study the Prisoner's Dilemma game where the payoff matrix is given by
and analytically derive the condition of favoring cooperation for uncorrelated networks. The game is done under a death-birth process with weak selection. In summary, we obtained the following four results.
(i) Although it has been widely thought that b/c > k is the condition of favoring cooperation, we show that b/c > k nn is the condition. The mean degree of players competing for a vacant vertex is k nn and the fitness of these adjacent players are determined by k nn ; then, k nn determines the outcome.
(ii) We show that among three representative networks, regular, random, and scale-free, a regular network favors cooperation the most and a scale-free network the least. This is because the condition depends on the mean degree of nearest neighbors, k nn . Whereas the scale-free network has the largest mean degree of nearest neighbors, the regular network has the least for the same value of the mean degree k .
(iii) In an ideal typical scale-free network characterized by the infinite number of vertices with γ ≤ 3, cooperation is unfeasible.
(iv) Although the scale-free network and the heterogeneous network favor cooperation in some cases, they suppress cooperation in our case. The scale-free network does not always favor cooperation irrespective of the game structure, although some occasionally believe so. Whether the scale-free network enhances or diminishes cooperation depends on details of the game.
(v) We show that if the number of players is small, then the cooperation is favored in scale-free networks.
This would not be the case if the condition were determined by the mean degree k , since the mean degree k is a fixed value determined by the exponent γ when the network size N is large enough. Suppose that the vertex 1 changes the strategy from B to A; then the pairs of k and k nn increases by one. On the other hand, suppose that the vertex 3 changes the strategy from B to A; then the pairs of k nn and k nn increases by two. One is seen from the vertex 3 to 4 and the other is seen from the vertex 4 to 3.
Next, we are going to study the case where q nn A|A decreases. Suppose that an A-player with degree k nn linked to k A A-players and k B B-players in the neighborhood is randomly chosen to update the strategy. The probability that it happens is given by
The probability that the randomly chosen A-player changes strategy from A to B is
If the A-player changes the strategy from A to B, then the conditional probability q We thus have Eq. (27) :
(A.7)
method, we count 2L pairs in total, where L denotes the number of links in the network. The pair probabilities computed by this method let us understand the relation q X|Y p Y = p XY = q Y |X p X . In the other method of computing pair probability, we first choose a link and check the strategies of vertices of both ends of the chosen link. The probability of finding a strategy X on one end is p nn X , and the conditional probability of finding a strategy Y on the other end given that the strategy X is already found is q nn Y |X . Then, we carry out this procedure iteratively for all L links. In this method, we count L pairs in total. The pair probabilities computed by this method let us understand the relation q Further, the relation p XY = p Y X holds. Therefore, the following equation holds:
Because of the mean-field approximation we replace the degree of nearest neighbors k nn by k nn and the degree k by k :
Therefore, p XY = q X|Y p Y holds in the mean-field approximation. Similarly, p Y X = q Y |X p X holds. Thus, q Y |X p X = p Y X = p XY = q X|Y p Y holds in the mean-field approximation.
